

## Introduction

On 16 July 1954 the United States Army's Far Eastern Command (FEC) contacted the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. FEC had been concerned for some time about the journalistic activities of Wilfred Burchett and his British colleague, Alan Winnington, who had proved troublesome during the recent Korean War. From behind the communist lines they had criticised the American negotiators during the Kaesong and Panmunjom peace talks, reported on the mistreatment of communist prisoners of war on Koje Island, and accused the US Air Force (USAF) of conducting bacteriological warfare raids over North Korea and China. According to FEC, the journalists had recently arrived in Indo-China. Fearing that they would again prove troublesome, FEC requested permission from the Menzies Government to declassify a US military intelligence report on Burchett and Winnington's activities in Korea.<sup>1</sup>

The report alleged that the journalists had been 'official spokesmen' for the North Korean and Chinese governments, and 'given aid and comfort to the enemy'. Furthermore, they had concocted the bacteriological warfare story, and forcibly extracted confessions from captured American airmen to legitimate it. Attached to the report were statements from four recently repatriated airmen who had recanted their confessions on returning to the US.<sup>2</sup> As the Australian

Embassy in Tokyo explained to the Department of External Affairs in Canberra, FEC was 'anxious' to use the airmen's statements 'in broadcasting pamphlets and other propaganda aimed at discrediting these two men'.<sup>3</sup> The Menzies Government, on the recommendation of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), had no objections. The Government had investigated the possibility of prosecuting Burchett for treason, but was frustrated by insufficient evidence. A 'smear' campaign discrediting the journalist was its only recourse. This involved painting Burchett as a communist propagandist and 'traitor', and maintaining the possibility of prosecution in order to deter him from returning.<sup>4</sup> As a consequence, the myth of Burchett the traitor was born.

Prior to the Korean War, Burchett had been a distinguished war correspondent with the London *Daily Express*. He had covered the Sino-Japanese War, the British rout in Burma, the US Fleet's campaign in the Pacific, and was the first correspondent into Hiroshima after the dropping of the atomic bomb. But with the onset of the Cold War, Burchett grew critical of US policy in Europe and Asia, and saw a rosier future in Eastern Europe's Soviet-brokered 'People's Democracies'. Resigning from the *Express*, he became an independently radical journalist, covering stories on the communist side of the ideological divide. For his efforts, the Menzies Government stripped him of his Australian passport in 1955 and his children were denied Australian citizenship.

But Burchett was a journalist whose stories could not be ignored. He had established invaluable contacts within the communist world, which made him a sought-after figure by both Western correspondents and diplomats. This was particularly apparent during the Vietnam War, where his coverage from Hanoi and behind the National Liberation Front's (NLF) lines saw him become arguably the war's most influential journalist. During this period, Burchett supped at the tables of Ho Chi Minh, Chou En-lai and Kim Il Sung; breakfasted with Kissinger in the bowels of the White House, and shook hands with Nixon during the latter's ground-breaking trip to China. As this book reveals, Burchett also worked with US and British diplomats in an attempt to secure the release of US prisoners of war in North Vietnam. At the height of his career during the late 1960s, his contacts were not only the envy of his colleagues, but also perhaps of several lesser

Liberal prime ministers. He was certainly one of the world's most influential Australians. Though he was allowed to settle in France and visit Britain and the US periodically, he was repeatedly denied an Australian passport and entry into his own country by successive Liberal governments. In December 1972, the newly elected Whitlam Labor Government returned Burchett's Australian passport. The decision angered those on the right who considered Burchett a traitor for his alleged activities in Korea and Vietnam, but Whitlam realised that Burchett had no charge to answer.

Still the attacks on Burchett's reputation continued. Drawing on the 1969 testimony of a Soviet defector to the US, Yuri Krotkov, before the US Senate Sub-committee on Internal Security, the right alleged that Burchett was a KGB agent. Despite being a minnow in espionage circles, Krotkov's testimony was tabled in the Senate by the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) senator, Vince Gair, where it fell under the protection of parliamentary privilege. In 1971, the testimony formed the basis of an attack on Burchett in the DLP organ, *Focus*. Burchett subsequently sued *Focus'* publisher and Gair's senate colleague, Jack Kane, for defamation. Though the court found that Burchett had been defamed, it ruled that the article was subject to parliamentary privilege. Costs were awarded against Burchett, financially exiling him from Australia.

The trial had provided Burchett with the opportunity to confront his critics and bury the traitorous myth. But the right used the decision to further foster the belief that Burchett had lost the case, thereby substantiating that he was a traitor after all. With his exile from Australia, and no further wars of note to bolster his flagging reputation, the traitorous myth, though contested, has largely prevailed. This was evident on Burchett's death in September 1983, as writers in Australia's mainstream dailies grappled over his problematic legacy. John Moses in *The Australian* suggested that Burchett was acknowledged by some as 'a gregarious, knowledgeable and—even—erudite man', while others demonised him as a 'traitor.' He had died, Moses added, with 'the enigmatic nature of his character and personality unsolved'.<sup>5</sup> Bill Hitchings in the Melbourne *Herald*, which had not been an admirer of Burchett's work, pondered whether the latter's life was 'myth or fact.' None the wiser, he concluded, it 'was certainly bizarre.'<sup>6</sup> Even those who said they knew and liked Burchett had their doubts. The

Melbourne *Sun*'s Tom Prior was a first-class foot-in-the-door news-scrapper. He had first met Burchett in New Caledonia in 1971, when the latter was attempting to re-enter Australia without a passport after an absence of 20 years. They were an odd couple: Prior the staunch DLP supporter, and Burchett the infamous communist sympathiser and traitor. But they became friends, and every Christmas until Burchett's death exchanged season's greetings. Prior remembered Burchett as 'a cultivated, civilised man who taught me most of the little I know about Asian peoples.' He added, 'I liked him and I'm sorry he's dead.' But he tempered his remarks with the suggestion that Burchett possibly was a traitor 'by the standards of the day.'<sup>7</sup>

For Burchett's enemies on the right, such obituaries were limp responses to a contemptible life. Thus, the traitorous Burchett had to be stridently reinforced to offset any moves by the journalist's supporters to redeem his reputation. It was inevitable that his life would become conjectural after his death, damned or praised according to the political shade of the writer or commentator. Snippets from his life would be used, often abused and sometimes lost amidst clamour from the left and right to push their respective ideological barrows. The polemicists set about writing their Burchetts to support the topic of the day; whether it be the Cambodian genocide, the re-writings of the Korean and Vietnam wars, or the debate over ASIO's relevance. He was to become known only within this parameter of jousting 'truths', obscuring the other Burchetts contained in his works, and in the voluminous literature of the various bureaucracies employed to plot his movements and chronicle his thoughts.

The debate over Burchett's legacy began in earnest in the early 1980s with the publication of Robert O'Neill's *Australia in the Korean War, 1950–1953*. It was the official history, and defended the UN and US line that the war was a defence against communist aggression. O'Neill assigned Brigadier Phillip Greville to write a chapter on the ordeals of Australian prisoners of war. Greville had been a prisoner in Korea, and so seemed a sound choice. But he had also testified on Jack Kane's behalf at the 1974 defamation trial. Not surprisingly, Greville used the official history to portray Burchett as a traitor who had tried to sway Australian and American prisoners from their allegiances to the UN.<sup>8</sup>

The historian Gavan McCormack was generally unimpressed by O'Neill's work. It had ignored the revisionist story of the war as told in

I. F. Stone's *Hidden History*, Burchett and Winnington's books and reports, and the more recent histories of Jon Halliday and Bruce Cummings. McCormack countered with his own revisionist version, *Cold War Hot War*, drawn in part from Burchett's reportage. In the August 1984 edition of *Australian Society*, McCormack dubbed Burchett 'an Australian Dreyfus', challenged the prevailing right-wing myths about his alleged KGB connections, while defending his reportage of the Korean War. According to McCormack, Burchett

... was a journalist inspired by an uncommon passion [who] ... was almost alone in seeing the War primarily from the viewpoint and suffering of the Korean people rather than that ... of the great powers or his own or any other governments.

Provocatively, McCormack declared Burchett was 'one of the great journalists of our time and an outstanding Australian'.<sup>9</sup> The claim drew a clamorous response from the right-wing monthly, *Quadrant*.

Originating as one of the CIA-sponsored Congress for Cultural Freedom's publishing armoury, *Quadrant* was pro-American and a trenchant critic of Burchett's work. In August 1967, it had published Denis Warner's scathing piece, 'Who is Wilfred Burchett?', which detailed—amongst other crimes—Burchett's alleged treacheries in Korea. More recently, *Quadrant* had carried Jack Kane's deceitful account of how he had unmasked Burchett as 'a Communist operative ... under KGB direction and control'.<sup>10</sup> But *Quadrant's* most carping Burchett critic was Frank Knopfelmacher. A post-war Eastern European émigré, he abhorred Soviet totalitarianism and Burchett's defence of it.<sup>11</sup> On Burchett's death, Knopfelmacher had suggested that a crown prosecution should have followed the Kane trial. But Knopfelmacher, like Kane, failed to mention that the jury had found the *Focus* article defamatory.<sup>12</sup> As with most of the *Quadrant* school's treatment of Burchett, Knopfelmacher's treatment was afflicted by selective memory.

Robert Manne was a former student of Knopfelmacher at the University of Melbourne. Though Manne has since distinguished himself as a critic of neoliberalism, he was once numbered amongst

the country's foremost Cold War warriors. He considered that the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the rise of German fascism were not dissimilar events. Both had left Manne 'suspicious ... of all dreams for the reconstruction of human society on the basis of logically explicated first principles.'<sup>13</sup> Manne felt that Australia's intellectual resolve to withstand totalitarianism had been weakened by the Vietnam War, as left-wing academics, like McCormack, 'doctored' history to justify 'neo-Stalinist' interpretations.<sup>14</sup> Manne held that 'liberal anti-communism ... [was] so completely defeated in western universities and intellectual circles that one could no longer hope that arguments couched in its language would be listened to seriously.'<sup>15</sup> Vigilantly, he pressed the anti-communist line and campaigned for a strong security network to counter leftist subversion. ASIO was Manne's bastion, and its former Director-General, Charles Spry, one of his heroes. He later praised Spry's dedication to the fight against communists and Soviet infiltrators. He was 'an Australian patriot of the old school', Manne declared.<sup>16</sup> As this book reveals, in the mid-1950s Spry had unsuccessfully pursued Burchett in the hope of securing a prosecution for treason. Manne's loyalty to Spry's memory invariably clouded his depiction of Burchett.

In 1985, ASIO's files on Burchett's Korean War activities were released under the 30 years' rule. Manne narrowly interpreted the papers, along with Burchett's letters to his family housed at the State Library of Victoria, to refute McCormack's assertions and tarnish the journalist's reputation once and for all. Manne's Burchett was a vulgar Stalinist who was an apologist for the Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe. He had acted as a communist propagandist, fabricating the germ warfare story, and had assisted in extracting confessions from the US airmen who had allegedly participated in the germ warfare raids. Burchett had also attempted to sway UN prisoners of war to the communist cause and was a KGB operative. He was 'in the deepest sense of the word a traitor.'<sup>17</sup>

Manne followed ASIO's line without adequately evaluating evidence to the contrary. He was involved in a war of words, in which facts and intellectual rigour were contested. Manne obviously considered he was caught in a propaganda war conducted according to the left's rules. The left, he argued, advocated revolution, supported social engineers and falsified history. Against such unscrupulous

opponents, the word war had to be fought on the left's terms, so Manne, the critic of left-wing historical caricaturists, pieced together a simple and believable caricature of his own from Burchett's ASIO file. For his efforts, he was awarded by *Quadrant* the 1985 George Watson Essay Prize. According to Knopfmacher, Manne's piece dispelled any 'lingering doubt' about Burchett's reputation.<sup>18</sup>

*Quadrant* followed it with Edwin Morrisby's 'Wilfred Burchett of the KGB?: A Memoir.' Morrisby was a former freelance filmmaker who had accompanied Burchett to Hanoi in the late 1960s. He claimed to have penned the article not as a Cold War propagandist, but as a 'friend' who 'knew [Burchett] as well as any'. It was a disingenuous claim, especially given the seriousness of Morrisby's allegations and the fact he was rarely mentioned in Burchett's correspondence. Morrisby's former Bulgarian girlfriend had apparently told him that Burchett was a KGB agent, and his Bulgarian-born wife, Vessa, a member of the Bulgarian secret police. Though Morrisby admitted that he had 'no concrete evidence' to support these, or his other claim that Burchett had received a large sum of money from the North Vietnamese, *Quadrant* considered them of significant importance to publish.<sup>19</sup> They were purely idle speculations, peddled as part of the journal's campaign to discredit Burchett. When Vessa Burchett publicly challenged the veracity of Morrisby's story, he suggested that 'she was not party to all aspects of [her husband's] character.' Astonishingly, Morrisby, who had met Burchett infrequently, claimed to know more about the journalist than his wife. Unlike Manne, Morrisby contended Burchett 'was not an agent of the KGB in the accepted sense ... but rather what the Soviets call[ed] an ... agent of influence.'<sup>20</sup> It marked a subtle but important shift.

The editor of the *Reader's Digest*, John Barron, had bandied about the term in his 1974 work, *KGB: The Work of Soviet Secret Agents*. Barron, who considered Krotkov one of the Soviet's most important defectors, suggested that the KGB used their 'own disguised voices' in all circles of Western life 'to alter opinion in the interests of the Soviet Union.'<sup>21</sup> At the time of Burchett's death, the concept had been given undue credibility. The former secretary of the Australian Labor Party, David Coombe, had allegedly been cultivated by a Soviet trade official, Valery Ivanov. At the subsequent Hope Royal Commission into ASIO, its Director-General, Harvey Barnett, alleged that Coombe was in

danger of becoming a Soviet agent of influence. In his 1984 report, Justice Hope reinforced that it was ASIO's responsibility to investigate cases of foreign governments attempting 'to cultivate a person in order that he act as an agent of influence for it.' Hope conceded that the subject under suspicion might have acted unwittingly or unknowingly, but this was secondary to the purpose of snaring the infiltrator.<sup>22</sup> The tag was indeed so broad-ranging that it could be used to cover anyone purporting an opinion favourable to the Soviet Union. For the likes of Morrisby, the tag could be conveniently used to smear enemies.

Melbourne's foremost Catholic propagandist, B. A. Santamaria, had been a longstanding critic of Burchett, and lent his support to Morrisby's claims. Santamaria edited the right-wing magazine, *News Weekly*, and had long considered Burchett a traitor.<sup>23</sup> In early 1986, he suggested in *Quadrant* that Morrisby had no ideological interest in Burchett, but was strictly a film producer and businessman, which rendered his story more believable. Of course, Santamaria's was a spurious argument, which did not deal with the substance of Morrisby's story. Santamaria also failed to state that Morrisby, at the time of his article, was an unemployed film producer who advertised in *Quadrant* for work. *Quadrant* was obviously impressed by his talents, as soon afterwards Morrisby's travel articles became a feature of the journal.<sup>24</sup>

The left responded, led again by Gavan McCormack, with support from the academic and writer, Alex Carey. In an article that exposed the support Burchett received from Australian diplomats Keith Waller and Malcolm Morris for the return of his passport during the 1960s, Carey briefly touched on the vacuous nature of the Government's case against the journalist.<sup>25</sup> McCormack's response, however, had been prompted by the personal nature of Manne's attack. Justifiably, McCormack suggested that 'the resort to character assassination ... pointed to the weakness of the right's case.' '[V]irulence', he argued, '[had been] substituted for argument.' McCormack rightly contended that Manne had ignored passages in Krotkov's 1974 deposition in support of Kane, which contradicted claims of Burchett's association with the KGB. He also reminded Manne that though Burchett had purportedly lost his case against Kane, the jury had still found the *Focus* article defamatory.<sup>26</sup> It was a point that the *Quadrant* school was loath to concede.

In 1986, the left countered with the most convincing argument to date. The Cambodian scholar, Ben Kiernan, assembled a collection of essays on Burchett's life and career. Entitled *Burchett: Reporting the Other Side of the World*, the collection included a moving memoir from John Pilger; Phillip Knightley's often-critical evaluation of Burchett's Second World War reportage; Kelvin Rowley's summation of Burchett's blind-spot for Stalinism; David Marr's praise of the journalist's work in Vietnam; and Beverly Smith's incorporation of Burchett's life into the Australian radical tradition. But it was again Gavan McCormack and Alex Carey whose contributions chipped away the traitorous façade by reiterating their positions on Burchett's work, and the Government's victimisation of him for not supporting its foreign policy line.

But they wrote in opposition to an already well-established narrative, fuelled by years of Burchett-baiting in the Australian press, and so were unable to dictate the terms of the debate. Furthermore, they were lone voices. As McCormack lamented, 'the Australian left showed only desultory interest in Burchett ... and mainstream Australian historians, political scientists and sociologists none at all.'<sup>27</sup> While Manne pieced together a cogent but selective narrative of the journalist's life, the left concentrated on undermining Manne's work, rather than mounting a Burchett of their own. As a result, Manne's Burchett, created and legitimated from ASIO's records, became the dominant Burchett. It was not merely a victory of right over left, but of journalistic style over academic substance, and Cold War caricature over the facts. As Manne later noted, the Cold War was a 'bitter struggle during which the prosecution of truth and complexity were frequently and on both sides ... sacrificed.'<sup>28</sup> His Burchett was tailored to suit the requirements of that 'struggle'.

This biography seeks to remove such ideological blinkers that have clouded understanding of Burchett's life and work. It is not the first Burchett biography. In 1988, the Melbourne journalist Roland Perry published *The Exile*. Though Perry's work claimed to be objective, it was little more than a rehash of the *Quadrant* school's well-worn traitorous line, though in a pot-boiler style and without the formality of academic substantiation. Despite the contentious nature of Burchett's career, there has not been an intellectually rigorous assessment of his life and the manner in which successive Liberal

governments sought to tarnish his reputation and deny him entry to Australia because he—as a journalist—reported the other side of the story.

As this biography suggests, Burchett was one of the twentieth century's great travellers and journalists, who crossed geographical and ideological frontiers. Hence, in contrast to the *Quadrant* line, it contends that Burchett was a traveller and not a traitor. As shown in 'Beginnings', his wanderlust began in the Depression when he jumped 'rattlers' to the sugar cane fields of northern New South Wales in search of work. By the late 1930s he was in Europe, where he witnessed the menace of German fascism and its persecution of the Jews, and began dabbling in travel writing. But it was the Burma Road that changed Burchett's life. He began his journey up the Road in 1941 as a travel writer, and ended it as a war correspondent for the London *Daily Express* in the world's most bombed city of the time, Chungking. The Road led him to the fall of Burma and his 'real' China peopled by the peasantry. Off the Road, he trudged with the American photographer George Rodger over the mountains of Northern Burma into India in April 1942, as the Japanese pushed northwards from Rangoon. As 'The Road' explains, Burchett wrote with heroic flourish of this trek and his other exploits in *Bombs Over Burma*. But his tone masked deep-seated fears and insecurities. As 'The Road' reveals, Burchett was haunted by the spectre of cowardice, following his wounding on Burma's Arakan front in late 1943. The Burchett of *Bombs* was written to placate his demons. It was a defining work, a declaration that he would no longer cower under fire.

In 1944 and 1945, he accompanied the American fleet on its island-hopping rout of the Japanese in the Pacific. It was a journey that would take Burchett across racial and ideological divides. Initially, he had marvelled at the destructive might of American technology, and dismissed the Japanese as racially inferior and semi-savage warmongers. But on arriving in Japan, he began to see them as victims. His journey to Hiroshima after the dropping of the atomic bomb removed his racist blinkers and, to the annoyance of the US military, he reported the victims' story of the bombing. As 'Falling Out' explains, Burchett questioned the bombing's morality, and began to suspect that the post-war era would not herald a new enlightened order based on peaceful co-existence between nations, but one ruled by American

military might. His suspicions were confirmed in post-war Germany, and later in Eastern Europe, where his reports increasingly adopted a pro-Soviet stance. Hence, he left the *Express* and became a crusading journalist for the left.

In 1952 Burchett and the British *Daily Worker's* Alan Winnington journeyed to the Korean city of Kaesong to cover the peace talks aimed at ending the Korean War. 'The Word as a Weapon' details Burchett and Winnington's accounts of the peace talks, and explores their accusations of American prison camp atrocities on Koje Island and bacteriological warfare raids over North Korea and China. Drawing on British Foreign Office documents, this chapter challenges the widely held view that Burchett and Winnington were communist 'hacks', by revealing that the British Government privately shared many of their reservations about the Americans' handling of the peace negotiations and their administration of the Koje Island prison camp. In drawing on the papers of the Cambridge University scientist, Joseph Needham, who investigated the germ warfare allegations, 'The Word as a Weapon' also reveals that there are solid grounds for suspecting that the USAF conducted the alleged raids. Hence, Burchett was merely reporting the truth as he saw it, and so was not a communist propagandist, as touted by the *Quadrant* school.

This book also reveals that Burchett's subsequent passport problems stemmed from the germ warfare allegations. In drawing extensively on ASIO and Department of Immigration files, the book uncovers new evidence showing that the Menzies Government lacked the evidence and legal clout to prosecute Burchett for treason, and so embarked on a campaign to discredit him and his work. Furthermore, as 'The Traitor' discloses, the Government was determined to use all means—legal and quasi-legal—to deny Burchett an Australian passport and his children their legitimate rights to Australian citizenship, and to use the threat of prosecution as a means of keeping him from Australia. Thus, the Menzies Government fostered the myth of 'Burchett the traitor'. As 'Reclaiming the Birthright' reveals, this myth was reinforced by the Holt, Gorton and McMahon governments, despite politicians and bureaucrats knowing it was legally indefensible.

The Vietnam War marked the turning point in Burchett's career. With his journeys into the areas of South Vietnam controlled by the

National Liberation Front (NLF), and his visits to Hanoi, Burchett crossed the ideological frontier. As the war escalated, he became a journalist of influence, courted by the Americans who were concerned about the welfare of their prisoners of war, and keen to establish an informal dialogue with Hanoi. Drawing on British Foreign Office documents, this book reveals details of Burchett's representations to the NLF on behalf of the US Ambassador-at-Large, Averell Harriman, and the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, for the release of American prisoners. It also tells of Burchett's ad hoc advice to American negotiators during the early stages of the Paris Peace Talks. As 'A Journalist of Influence' reveals, the British and American governments expressed their gratitude by allowing Burchett to visit both countries at a time when he was barred from Australia.

'The Trial' traces Burchett's ill-fated attempt to sue Jack Kane for defamation. Drawing on private correspondence and the court transcript, it shows that Burchett was ill-prepared for court, that several of Kane's witnesses clearly had altered their original stories, and that Justice Robert Taylor's summing-up to the jury unfairly reinforced the traitorous stereotype. With the loss of his 1976 appeal, Burchett was financially exiled from Australia. As shown in 'Ruptures', his final years were spent watching his so-called Asian revolutionary brothers—the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Chinese—warring amongst themselves, whilst attempting to defend his journalism against the claim that it was communist propaganda and the work of a traitor.

Though the Kiernan collection of essays provided invaluable insights into Burchett's work, and the Menzies Government's victimisation of him, it is now dated. As is evident in this biography, substantial evidence now exists in Australian, British and US archives to further bolster McCormack and Carey's earlier claims of government victimization. But this biography also shows that Burchett was an extraordinary Australian, whose story deserves to be told alongside the government-orchestrated myth of the traitor. Together, they tell of an extraordinary life, and one of the largely untold scandals in this country's history.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Australian Embassy, Tokyo, to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 16 July 1954, NAA6119/XR1, item 15, folio 21, NAA.
- <sup>2</sup> Confidential US Army Report, 'Communist Intelligence and Propaganda Activities of Wilfred Burchett and Alan Winnington', *ibid*, folios 27–31, NAA.
- <sup>3</sup> Cablegram, 16 July 1954, Australian Embassy *op cit*.
- <sup>4</sup> See the comments of the Director-General of Security on the Tokyo cablegram, 16 July 1954; and Department of External Affairs, Canberra, to the Australian Embassy, Tokyo, 27 July 1954, *ibid*, folio 20.
- <sup>5</sup> *The Australian*, 29 September 1983.
- <sup>6</sup> *Melbourne Herald*, 28 September 1983.
- <sup>7</sup> *Melbourne Sun*, 29 September 1983.
- <sup>8</sup> Phillip Greville, 'The Australian Prisoners of War', in O'Neill's *Australia in the Korean War*, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1983, p. 565.
- <sup>9</sup> Gavan McCormack, 'The Australian Dreyfus? Re-examination of the Case Against Journalist Wilfred Burchett', *Australian Society*, vol 3, no 8, 1 August 1984.
- <sup>10</sup> Denis Warner, 'Who is Wilfred Burchett', *Quadrant*, August–September 1967; and Jack Kane, 'Burchett on Trial?', *Quadrant*, October 1981.
- <sup>11</sup> Frank Knopfelmacher, 'My Political Education', in *Quadrant 25 Years*, p. 132.
- <sup>12</sup> Knopfelmacher, 'As I Please: Traitor Burchett', *Quadrant*, November 1983.
- <sup>13</sup> Manne, *The Culture of Forgetting*, pp. 106–107 and 'The Shadow of 1917' in *The Shadow of 1917: Cold War Conflict in Australia*, p. 16.
- <sup>14</sup> Manne, 'He Chose Stalin: The Case of Wilfred Burchett', *ibid*, p. 32.
- <sup>15</sup> Manne, 'Pol Pot and the Intellectuals', *ibid*, pp. 180–181.
- <sup>16</sup> See Manne's obituary to Spry in Melbourne's *The Age*, 1 June 1994.
- <sup>17</sup> Manne, 'He Chose Stalin', *op cit*, p. 92.
- <sup>18</sup> Knopfelmacher, 'As I Please: Wilfred Burchett's Treason – Drifting into a Moral Morass', *Quadrant*, September 1985, pp. 32–33. Robert Manne, 'The Shadow of 1917' in *The Shadow of 1917: Cold War Conflict in Australia*, p. 13.
- <sup>19</sup> Edwin Morrisby, 'Wilfred Burchett of the KGB?: A Memoir', *Quadrant*, October 1985, pp. 28, 32.
- <sup>20</sup> Morrisby, 'My Reply to Mme Burchett – An Open Letter', *Quadrant*, July–August 1986, p. 37.
- <sup>21</sup> Barron, *KGB: The Work of Soviet Agents*, p. 26.
- <sup>22</sup> *Report of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation*, November 1984, pp. 31, 35.
- <sup>23</sup> See B. A. Santamaria, 'Burchett: What Does Treason Mean?', *News Weekly*, 5 October 1983.
- <sup>24</sup> Santamaria, 'The Burchett Case: Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy', *Quadrant*, January–February 1986. Morrisby's advertisement for work appeared in the April 1986 issue.
- <sup>25</sup> Alex Carey, 'Burchett's Diplomatic Defenders', *Australian Society*, September 1985, p. 85.

<sup>26</sup> McCormack, 'The New Right and Human Rights: Cultural Freedom and the Burchett Affair', *Meanjin*, Vol 45, No 3, September 1986, pp. 389–396.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid*, p. 390.

<sup>28</sup> Manne, 'The Shadow of 1917' *op cit*, p. 13.