Chapter Synopses

Preface

The preface to Asian Alternatives is available for free download.

References

The References for Asian Alternatives are available only online, and are downloadable for free.

Chapter 1: The Foreign Policy Setting

This chapter provides an historical context for the remainder of the book. Menzies progressively achieved dominance over Australian foreign policy through the 1950s. For international, domestic and personal advantage he stressed loyalty to alliances entered into in the Cold War. However, he was most comfortable with the British relationship embodying race patriotism. In 1960-61, when Menzies was also Minister for External Affairs, he found himself increasingly out of touch with Macmillan's embrace of 'the wind of change' in Africa and Kennedy's 'New Frontier', which was attentive to the 'third world'. The young Department of External Affairs (DEA) provided the bureaucratic support for Australian foreign policy. It established its influence by developing expertise on Asia, using security relationships to develop information exchange, and finding independent positions between the US and the UK in Asia. Menzies was succeeded in the External Affairs portfolio by two strong-minded men, Barwick and Hasluck. Their contrasting approaches to instabilities in Asia were crucial to Australia deciding to go to war.

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Chapter 2: Barwick's Introduction to Foreign Policy: Laos 1959-62

Barwick's introduction to Australian foreign policy and to Asia was to act from 1959 as Foreign Minister during the absences of Casey and Menzies. He faced crises in Laos in 1959 and 1961, in which the Menzies government was willing to go to war alongside the US even if others stood aside. Historians have failed to give Barwick credit for the personal touch he applied to Australia's conventional policies. Barwick preferred UN to military action. He insisted that geography dictated that Australia's long-term interest lay in standing in the right light with Asia. The US should therefore recognise that there was a mutual interest in Australia not being seen as its only military ally, ie deputy sheriff. Barwick supported Kennedy's neutralisation of Laos in 1961-2. In taking these positions Barwick gave a lead to officials, whose qualities and characteristics are described.

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Chapter 3: Barwick and Indonesia I: Dutch New Guinea Goes West 1962

Australia's bipartisan approach from 1949-61 of keeping Dutch New Guinea (NG) out of Indonesian hands is summarised. Barwick set out to overturn this deeply-entrenched policy, and was criticised as an 'appeaser' of Sukarno's Indonesia. While Cabinet put him under constraints, it acknowledged the force of his arguments for accepting inevitable change. Barwick warned Indonesia against the use of force, complementing Kennedy's policy of doing likewise while mediating transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch. At the end of 1962, with the running sore of NG excised, Barwick set out to put ballast into Australia's relationship with its nearest neighbour.

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Chapter 4: Barwick and Vietnam I: Focus on John F Kennedy

The 1962 ANZUS Council meeting was the first held in Canberra. Cabinet instructed Barwick to probe the depth of the Kennedy administration's commitment to Southeast Asia. US Secretary of State Rusk put the American case privately and publicly for Australian military involvement in Vietnam. Australia's response was to send thirty experienced advisers, comprising the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV). Barwick would have preferred a much smaller commitment, and insisted on its non-combatant role. In bilateral discussions on nuclear weapons Barwick argued against their further use in Asia because of the political fall-out. While promised discussions on guide-lines did not eventuate, the US soon removed authority to use nuclear weapons from military commanders. Rusk sought support for British entry into Europe and use of wheat sales to China as a pressure point in regard to Indo-China. Barwick's vigorously independent stance won Rusk's respect, though Australia was viewed critically as a dinosaur on 'third world' issues by Kennedy's New Frontiersmen.

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Chapter 5: Indonesia II: Managing Confrontation 1963-64

Indonesia proclaimed 'Confrontation' of the proposed Federation of Malaysia comprising Malaya, Singapore and Borneo believing it to represent neo-colonialism. In response, Barwick gained the carriage of policy, which he made in conjunction with his officials and diplomats, whose portraits and influence are sketched. Barwick ensured that Britain, as the former colonial power, had the primary military responsibility for the new Federation. His independent diplomacy, encouraging regional dialogue, making every effort to consult with and understand Indonesia, and avoiding the commitment of Australian ground forces to the Borneo hostilities, was crucial. He was equally forthright on issues of race. He believed in 'informed public debate'. Barwick continued to be cast as an 'appeaser' by political and press critics, and in addition by officers of the Prime Minister's Department and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. However, despite the fact that Barwick often required Menzies ' and Cabinet as a whole to change policies, they were able to work together as a result of mutual respect. When Indonesia stepped up confrontation of Malaysia, Barwick was more active in support of the latter, particularly in Washington and New York. Barwicks policy of 'controlled, graduated and flexible response' to Indonesia irritated the UK and did not wholly reassure the US, but it carried the day.

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Chapter 6: Vietnam II: Minimum Exposure 1962-64

The author argues that Barwick's approach to the Vietnam war has been incorrectly interpreted as interventionist, subservient to the US, simplistically anti-communist and unimaginative. In refuting these analyses, he particularly examines the arguments put forward by biographer David Marr, and explains why he disagrees with Marr's judgment that Barwick was a party to deceiving the Australian parliament and public about the AATTV having a combat role. Barwick was cautious and pragmatic about Vietnam, regarding it as America's responsibility, under a division of labour which assigned Indonesia-Malaysia to Commonwealth countries.

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Chapter 7: Vale Barwick, Ave Hasluck April 1964

Barwick, the self-styled 'radical Tory', and Hasluck, an orthodox conservative and maximal realist, are contrasted. They had different approaches to working with officials and ministerial colleagues, to managing alliance relationships, and to Asia. The differences went to the heart of policy, and help to explain why a change from a pragmatic to a doctrinaire Foreign Minister led to Australia becoming a belligerent in Vietnam.

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Chapter 8: Post-Barwick: Vietnam Becomes 'Vital'

Australia made its first ground combat commitment alongside the Americans to Vietnam in May 1964 by changing the role of the AATTV (although its commander had anticipated the political decision). After visiting Saigon in June Hasluck ordered priority for Vietnam. He judged it essential that the US should apply military pressure against the North, which he treated as a surrogate for the main enemy, China. Hasluck with peculiar intensity sought to inject conformity and urgency about winning the war into officials' thinking. Nevertheless, the latter continued to provide pessimistic forecasts. They also took the opposite view from their minister's that Indonesia-Malaysia, where large-scale war was narrowly averted in September and Australia was able to exercise a restraining role, was a higher political and security priority for Australia than Vietnam.

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Chapter 9: The Month Before the Vietnam Decision: November 1964

In November 1964 the Australian government conducted its periodical defence review. Its professional advisers, the Defence Committee (DC), stated that Indonesia posed the only threat to Australia and Papua New Guinea. Australia might have to fight alone. Cabinet introduced conscription and doubled the defence budget. The DC did not envisage Australian involvement in South Vietnam but bolstering Thailand if South Vietnam and Laos went communist. A DEA policy planning paper argued that neutralisation was an option in Indo-China, with the first step being a new international conference on Laos. In Washington, however, Hasluck was monitoring likely US escalation in Vietnam after the Presidential election and anticipated Australia would be involved.

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Chapter 10: The Die is Cast: December 1964

The author, contesting the accepted historiography, argues, using an informal Cabinet record, that Australia took the decision in principle to send a battalion to Vietnam on 17 December 1964, and not over four months later when it was announced. Civilian officials in DEA and the Department of Defence who were extremely cautious about escalating the ground war were frozen out. Ministers relied on their military advisers, who suppressed their concerns in order to reach agreement on sending a battalion, which was what ministers wanted, although the US had asked only for a bigger AATTV. The decision to go to war was deeply flawed.

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Chapter 11: Between the Cup and the Lip, The Decision and the Announcement: December 1964-April 1965

Between December 1964 and April 1965 Australia sweated on the US convening military staff talks on its contribution of a battalion. The delay was primarily due to President Johnson's determination to maintain secrecy and to portray increased escalation of the war as involving no change of policy. During the period the role of projected foreign ground forces changed from deterrence to operational. Australia encouraged the US to escalate and opposed negotiations, although DEA unsuccessfully sought to reopen the December decision. At the last minute, on 7 April, after the military staff talks, which rubber-stamped the decision on the battalion without canvassing the large issues involved, Hasluck had qualms, but he was quashed by Menzies.

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Chapter 12: The Role of External Affairs: Warmongers or Good Public Servants'

The frequently made allegation that Vietnam was DEA's war is refuted.
The case made by Sexton in the most recent reiteration of this claim is critically examined. As the narrative has shown, DEA was not a party to the Cabinet decision of 17 December 1964. Although in April 1965 it accepted the inevitability of the decision being implemented, in the interim it had sought, unsuccessfully, to have the question of sending foreign ground combat forces to Vietnam reopened and comprehensively examined, both by ministers and at the military staff talks. There was a wide range of opinion within DEA about the war, but it acted responsibly and professionally in pressing cautionary advice.

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Chapter 13: Why the Commitment, and Why the Battalion'

The government acted out of perceptions of national interest and moral obligation. Apprehension about US support for Australia against Indonesia made the strengthening of the ANZUS tie seem particularly important to all ministers. Hasluck's belief in great power balances emphasised the conventional conservative theme of the US and allies containing Asian communism. The framework for doing so included the UK and four-power (with NZ) co-operation, which Australia clung to despite the British retreat from east of Suez. The unity between Menzies and Hasluck, the latitude extended to their military advisers and expectation of party political advantage were also determinants of a single-minded policy of sending troops to Vietnam. Other commonly advanced explanations, like forward defence, making up for the 'locust years' of low defence budgets and helping the South Vietnamese people are less clear-cut.

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Chapter 14: Theories and 'Lessons of History'

The historical analogies in the minds of western leaders were shared by Australian ministers. Menzies was 'a man of Munich' and set against appeasement. The 'domino theory' had been expressed by Australian ministers from 1950 and Hasluck went furthest in uncritically expanding its frontiers. The Korean war analogy was interpreted in a comforting way. Malaya and Malaysia were influential on Kennedy as well as Canberra, so that it is disappointing that the Australian experience was treated superficially. The Berlin and France/Dien Bien Phu analogies were employed for political effect. Like the drunk holding on to the lamp-post, Australia used the 'lessons of history' for support rather than illumination.

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Chapter 15: Were there Alternatives for Australia'

The sending of the battalion to Vietnam was not predetermined. Australia had choices. The first was to rest on the agreed division of labour between the US and the Commonwealth, and to give priority for troop commitments to Indonesia-Malaysia. Australia could have justified this course in Washington. It was becoming inevitable that Australia would have to send a battalion, and perhaps two, to Borneo, while Australia's political dialogue with Indonesians would become even more important as US escalation in Vietnam diminished its influence in Jakarta. Military aid to Vietnam short of a ground force, either air and sea forces or more advisers, were other options. Sending more advisers would have established Australia's status as a thinking ally and just might have influenced the course on which Johnson was embarked, as he had respect for Menzies and affectionate memories of Australia from WWII.

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Chapter 16: Barwick not Hasluck ' a Counter-factual

The author agrees with American historians, particularly, recently, Logevall and Kaiser, who argue that Vietnam was 'Johnson's war', and that Kennedy would have taken a different course 'if Oswald had missed'. He essays a similar counter-factual for Australia, arguing that it would have taken a different course if Menzies had granted Barwick's wish in April 1964 to stay on as Foreign Minister for a year. In 1964 Barwick would have opposed increasing the AATTV and sending it into combat, and he would have listened to his officials instead of asserting dominance. He would not have given Vietnam priority over Indonesia, he would not have injected himself into America's military choices, and he would not have demonised the threat from China, There would have been no rush to action on 17 December, but orderly Cabinet consideration at a measured pace. Barwick would have recapitulated his consistent positions. Australia should be cautious about going to war and clear about the long-term implications of doing so. Military objectives in Vietnam should also be made clear to ministers, and recourse to foreign ground forces should be justified. There should be no over-commitment. Australia's role should be limited to helping the South Vietnamese wage a politico-military struggle in the villages which only they could win. Australia should try to stand in the right light in Asia. It should be in good international company. It should not reject negotiations. If, after putting all its concerns to the Americans, it deemed that involvement alongside them was essential to ANZUS, Australia could meet America's specific request of it, for more advisers in a training role alongside South Vietnamese. Barwick, in his last good fight, could have persuaded Cabinet not to send a ground combat force to Vietnam.

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Appendix: Enduring Features in Decision-Making

Can we learn from Vietnam' Fifty features of decision-making on going to war in Vietnam are listed which seem consistent with recent history in regard to Iraq.